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Josh Lefkowitz
Chief Executive Officer
Josh Lefkowitz executes the company’s strategic vision to empower organizations with Business Risk Intelligence (BRI). He has worked extensively with authorities to track and analyze terrorist groups. Mr. Lefkowitz also served as a consultant to the FBI’s senior management team and worked for a top tier, global investment bank. Mr. Lefkowitz holds an MBA from Harvard University and a BA from Williams College.
Evan Kohlmann
Chief Innovation Officer
Evan Kohlmann focuses on product innovation at Flashpoint where he leverages fifteen years’ experience tracking Al-Qaida, ISIS, and other terrorist groups. He has consulted for the US Department of Defense, the US Department of Justice, the Australian Federal Police, and Scotland Yard’s Counter Terrorism Command, among others. Mr. Kohlmann holds a JD from the Univ. of Pennsylvania Law School and a BSFS in International Politics from the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown Univ.
Josh Devon
Chief Operating Officer / VP Product
Josh Devon focuses on product vision and strategy at Flashpoint while ensuring the company’s departments function synergistically during its rapid growth. He also works to ensure that customers receive best in class products, services, and support. Previously, Mr. Devon co-founded the SITE Intelligence Group where he served as Assistant Director. He holds an MA from SAIS at Johns Hopkins Univ. At the Univ. of Pennsylvania, he received a BS in Economics from the Wharton School and a BA in English from the College of Arts and Sciences.
Jennifer Leggio
Chief Marketing Officer / VP Operations
Jennifer Leggio is responsible for Flashpoint’s marketing, customer acquisition, and operations. Ms. Leggio has more than 20 years of experience driving marketing, communications and go-to-market strategies in the cybersecurity industry. She’s previously held senior leadership roles at Digital Shadows, Cisco, Sourcefire, and Fortinet. She’s been a contributor to Forbes and ZDNet, and has spoken on the importance of coordinated disclosure at DEF CON and Hack in the Box, and on threat actor “publicity” trends at RSA Conference, Gartner Security Summit, and SXSW Interactive.
Chris Camacho
Chief Strategy Officer
Chris Camacho leads the company’s client engagement and development team, which includes customer success, business development, strategic integrations and the FPCollab sharing community. With over 15 years of cybersecurity leadership experience, he has spearheaded initiatives across Operational Strategy, Incident Response, Threat Management, and Security Operations to ensure cyber risk postures align with business goals. Most recently as a Senior Vice President of Information Security at Bank of America, Mr. Camacho was responsible for overseeing the Threat Management Program. An entrepreneur, Mr. Camacho also serves as CEO for NinjaJobs: a career-matching community for elite cybersecurity talent. He has a BS in Decision Sciences & Management of Information Systems from George Mason University.
Lisa Iadanza
Chief People Officer
Lisa M. Iadanza leads all functional areas of People Operations at Flashpoint, including human resources, talent acquisition & management, employee engagement, and developing high performance teams. In addition to collaborating with the executive team to drive strategic growth, she plays an integral role in fostering Flashpoint’s culture and mission. Driven by her passions for mentorship, employee advocacy, and talent development, Ms. Iadanza has more than twenty years of experience in building, scaling, and leading human resources functions. Prior to Flashpoint, she held leadership roles at Conde Nast, Terra Technology, and FreeWheel. She is a member of the Society for Human Resources Management (SHRM) and holds a bachelor’s degree in management with concentrations in human resources and marketing from State University of New York at Binghamton.
Rob Reznick
VP of Finance and Corporate Development
Rob Reznick leads the finance, accounting, and corporate development teams at Flashpoint. Rob previously served as Director of Finance & Accounting for 1010data (acquired by Advance/Newhouse), and Director of Finance for Financial Guard (acquired by Legg Mason) after prior work in forensic accounting and dispute consulting. Mr. Reznick is a Certified Public Accountant and holds an MBA and MAcc from the Fisher College of Business at the Ohio State University, and a BBA from the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan.
Lance James
Chief Scientist / VP Engineering
Lance James is responsible for leading Flashpoint’s technology development. Prior to joining Flashpoint in 2015, he was the Head of Cyber Intelligence at Deloitte & Touche LLP. Mr. James has been an active member of the security community for over 20 years and enjoys working creatively together with technology teams to design and develop impactful solutions that disrupt online threats.
Brian Costello
SVP Global Sales and Solution Architecture
Brian Costello, a 20-year information technology and security solutions veteran, is responsible for leading the Global Sales, Solution Architecture, and Professional Services teams at Flashpoint. Throughout his career, Brian has successfully built security and cloud teams that have provided customers with innovative technology solutions, exceeded targets and consistently grown business year over year. Prior to Flashpoint, Brian led a global security and cloud vertical practice for Verizon. Brian also held senior leadership roles at Invincea, Risk Analytics and Cybertrust. Brian received his B.A. from George Mason University.
Tom Hofmann
VP Intelligence
Tom Hofmann leads the intelligence directorate that is responsible for the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of Deep and Dark Web data. He works closely with clients to prioritize their intelligence requirements and ensures internal Flashpoint operations are aligned to those needs. Mr. Hofmann has been at the forefront of cyber intelligence operations in the commercial, government, and military sectors, and is renowned for his ability to drive effective intelligence operations to support offensive and defensive network operations.
Jake Wells
VP, Client Engagement & Development
Jake Wells leads strategic integrations and information sharing as part of the client engagement & development team, which serves as an internal advocate for our government and commercial clients to ensure Flashpoint’s intelligence solutions meet their evolving needs. He leverages a decade of experience running cyber and counterterrorism investigations, most recently with the NYPD Intelligence Bureau, to maximize the value customers generate from our products and services. Mr. Wells holds an MA from Columbia University and a BA from Emory University.
Brian Brown
VP Business Development
Brian Brown is responsible for the overall direction of strategic sales and development supporting Flashpoint’s largest clients. In his role, Mr. Brown focuses on designing and executing growth-oriented sales penetration strategies across multiple vertical markets, including both Government and Commercial, supporting Flashpoint’s Sales and Business Development Teams. An experienced entrepreneur, Mr. Brown also serves as CSO for NinjaJobs, a private community created to match elite cybersecurity talent with top tier global jobs and also advise growth-stage cybersecurity companies.
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U.S. Thieves Exploring ATM Jackpotting Attacks

Blog
May 29, 2018

In January, the Secret Service warned U.S. banks that a form of robbery known as ATM jackpotting, which had already proliferated across Europe, Asia, and Latin America since as early as 2009, had finally made its way to the U.S., with at least six attacks taking place within a single week.

The underlying factors contributing to the emergence of ATM jackpotting in the U.S. are not entirely clear. However, Flashpoint analysts believe U.S. companies’ ongoing adoption of the same EMV security standards that have made payment card fraud infeasible in other countries is driving threat actors to explore other types of crime. It also appears as though actors from other countries are bringing their tactics, techniques, and procedures to the U.S., or at least sharing them with U.S.-based threat actors, as evidenced by the use of Ploutus.D malware, which was first observed in Mexico in 2013.

ATM Jackpotting: An Overview

Also known as logical attacks, ATM jackpotting attacks are defined as manipulation of an ATM that causes it to eject cash, either by infecting it with malware or connecting it to an external device, referred to as a “black box,” which connects to the machine’s cash dispenser as a stand-in for the ATM’s CPU. If the ATM’s security controls are bypassed successfully, the black box can receive commands from another device, prompting the machine to dispense cash.

Flashpoint analysts observed very little chatter about black-box attacks that could possibly be linked to actors residing or operating in North America. However, in May 2017, Europol published a press release announcing the arrests of 27 individuals associated with black-box attacks across Europe, more specifically, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and Norway.

In Europe, the total number of ATM jackpotting attacks increased 231 percent from 58 incidents in 2016 to 192 in 2017. Flashpoint analysts believe ATM jackpotting is also widespread in parts of Asia and Latin America, but precise numbers are not available.

ATM jackpotting typically requires some form of physical connection to the targeted machine, typically through its USB port. In some cases, standalone ATM operators with lax security practices have been known to use generic ATM keys, which Flashpoint analysts have observed for sale on legitimate, open-web ecommerce sites. However, in most cases, threat actors must gain access to ATM ports through other means, such as drilling holes in, or melting, its plastic shell. Jackpotting crews have also been known to use endoscopes to reconnoiter the machine’s internal systems.

Numerous malware families available on DDW forums and marketplaces have been known to be utilized in jackpotting schemes, including the Ploutus malware family, which first appeared in 2013 but remains under active development, and Cutlet Maker, which Flashpoint analysts first observed for sale on DDW forums in June 2017.

A still from a video posted on a DDW forum, allegedly showing the insertion of a USB stick into an ATM as part of a malware injection jackpotting attack.
Image 1: A still from a video posted on a DDW forum, allegedly showing the insertion of a USB stick into an ATM as part of a malware injection jackpotting attack.
A still from a video on posted on a DDW marketplace, allegedly showing Cutlet Maker successfully running on an ATM.
Image 2: A still from a video on posted on a DDW marketplace, allegedly showing Cutlet Maker successfully running on an ATM.

The Role of the Deep & Dark Web

Flashpoint analysts have observed widespread discussion of ATM jackpotting attacks on the DDW, typically involving the use of malware such as Ploutus.D, Cutlet Maker, Ripper, and Tyupkin. Flashpoint analysts have also observed threat actors exchanging instructional guides on how to target specific types of machines using specific malware strains, thus lowering the barriers to entry for carrying out ATM jackpotting attacks among low-skill threat actors.

Cybercrime forums provide threat actors interested in ATM jackpotting with a platform to connect with other criminals and hatch schemes. For example, in March 2017, an actor on a Russian-language forum posted in English, claiming to have full USB access to a certain type of ATM and stating that they were seeking a partner with access to ATM malware.

These partnerships may transcend geographic boundaries, as evidenced by multiple posts on a Russian-language DDW forums seeking accomplices in a scheme targeting ATMs in Asia in mid-to-late 2017. The actors did not elaborate on the reasons for their focus on Asia or their avoidance of the U.S. However, Flashpoint analysts speculate that these actors are likely attempting to take advantage of the potentially lax security measures they expect to find in certain regions with less-developed cyber defenses. 

ATM Jackpotting Attack Execution

Flashpoint analysts believe criminals may leverage ATM technical support manuals not intended for public consumption that have been leaked online to obtain the specific information needed to plan a jackpotting attack.

According to one tutorial on an English-language DDW forum, the initial visit to a target ATM to inject malware or bypass security controls should only take two or three minutes, with a maximum duration of four minutes. In order to execute a technical attack in such a small window of time, jackpotting crews must proactively determine the ATM vulnerabilities they intend to exploit, as well as the location and means of getting to access points such as USB ports, often using a drill and/or endoscope. Jackpotting crews may also be able to determine when the ATM’s cash box is filled, as well as any daily limits for dispensing cash, in order to maximize the amount of cash they are able to steal.

Once they have selected a machine to target, ATM jackpotting crews—typically disguised as ATM technicians to evade suspicion—physically tamper with the ATM to either infect the it with malware or bypass its security controls and connect it to an external device.

Some ATM jackpotting crews prefer to execute their attacks in one visit, cashing out the machine immediately after injecting it with malware or connecting it to an external device. Others find a multi-visit approach to be more inconspicuous, deploying mules to retrieve the dispensed funds after the actors disguised as ATM technicians have finished servicing the machine. After the mules have carried out their heist, the “ATM technicians” return to the machine to return it to its pre-attack state and retrieve any hardware connected to the ATM.

Mitigation Measures

To combat ATM jackpotting, Diebold Nixdorf advises ATM operators to limit physical access to ATMs using appropriate locking mechanisms and two-factor authentication. ATM operators should also keep firmware updated with the latest security functionality, use secure encryption, and immediately investigate any suspicious activity.

Assessment

Given the lucrative nature of ATM jackpotting attacks, Flashpoint analysts believe threat actors will continue to target standalone ATMs perceived to be outdated, unpatched, or otherwise vulnerable. Although there has been a recent wave of jackpotting attacks in the U.S., Flashpoint analysts do not believe the attacks will become as pervasive as they are in certain areas of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America where outdated but still operational ATMs are more commonplace.

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Ian W. Gray

Senior Intelligence Analyst

Ian W. Gray is a Senior Intelligence Analyst at Flashpoint, where he focuses on producing strategic and business risk intelligence reports on emerging cybercrime and hacktivist threats. Ian is a military reservist with extensive knowledge of the maritime domain and regional expertise on the Middle East, Europe, and South America. As a Veteran Volunteer, Ian supports The Homefront Foundation, a non-profit that helps veterans and first responders share their experiences through focused story-telling workshops. His insights and commentary have been featured in publications including Wired, Christian Science Monitor Passcode, ThreatPost, TechTarget, The Washington Examiner, Cyberscoop, The Diplomat, and others. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies from Fordham University and a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University.

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